The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany's post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China's rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany's armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany's current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin's European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that: Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than rejecting the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power - including military power - in international affairs. The authors show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy.

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community s capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions.

This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily its level of ambition and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

In the twenty-first century, the European Union is confronted by myriad security problems that demand concerted action and cooperation. As a negotiating power, it seeks to persuade Iran to forswear a nuclear weapons programme. As a crisis manager it seeks to contribute to global peace and stability through civilian and military operations. Closer to home, it is wrestling with questions about membership enlargement, large-scale migration and terrorist threats to the security of its populations and infrastructure. European governments, already under financial strain from ageing workforces and welfare systems, face ever more difficult choices about budget cuts in security and defence after the near-collapse of the global banking system. Will it be possible to enhance cooperation between member states? How can the EU complete its transition from a security actor with great potential to a player that credibly aligns available policy instruments and resources? These and other issues about the very nature and identity of the Union are explored in this Adelphi. From the need to establish its hard-power credentials, overcome its reluctance to demonstrate them against non-compliant states, and leverage its relationships with other great powers, to attempts to break its dependence on Russian energy, it is clear the EU has its work cut out. But, by affirming its commitment to multilateralism and defining a careful balance between closer cooperation and the national security concerns of EU member states, this book suggests, the European Union can build on its status as a global security power in the making.

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community s capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily its level of ambition and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

In the twenty-first century, the European Union is confronted by myriad security problems that demand concerted action and cooperation. As a negotiating power, it seeks to persuade Iran to forswear a nuclear weapons programme. As a crisis manager it seeks to contribute to global peace and stability through civilian and military operations. Closer to home, it is wrestling with questions about membership enlargement, large-scale migration and terrorist threats to the security of its populations and infrastructure. European governments, already under financial strain from ageing workforces and welfare systems, face ever more difficult choices about budget cuts in security and defence after the near-collapse of the global banking system. Will it be possible to enhance cooperation between member states? How can the EU complete its transition from a security actor with great potential to a player that credibly aligns available policy instruments and resources? These and other issues about the very nature and identity of the Union are explored in this Adelphi. From the need to establish its hard-power credentials, overcome its reluctance to demonstrate them against non-compliant states, and leverage its relationships with other great powers, to attempts to break its dependence on Russian energy, it is clear the EU has its work cut out. But, by affirming its commitment to multilateralism and defining a careful balance between closer cooperation and the national security concerns of EU member states, this book suggests, the European Union can build on its status as a global security power in the making.

The present anthology stems from the perception of a widespread and manifest uneasiness concerning the business of military intervention in our times. Indeed, the West is for quite some time engaged in a deep introspection about his military intervention policies in the years to come and reflects about this. What will Western military intervention policies look like in the future; what kind of military intervention policies is wanted and what kind of military intervention policies is financially, politically and socio-culturally possible and militarily feasible? The hypothesis pursued in this volume states that, in the foreseeable future, we may see a different kind of military intervention policy and intervention posture of the West that will lead to different military interventions. It may be argued that we are witnessing the dawn of a new era, the era of military post-interventionism.

European countries work together in crisis management, conflict prevention and many other aspects of security and defence policy. Closer cooperation in this policy arena seems to be the only viable way forward to address contemporary security challenges. Yet, despite the repeated interaction, fundamental assumptions about security and defence remain remarkably distinct across European nations. This book offers a comparative analysis of the security and defence policies of all 27 EU member states and Turkey, drawing on the concept of 'strategic culture', in order to examine the chances and obstacles for closer security and defence cooperation across the continent. Along the lines of a consistent analytical framework, international experts provide case studies of the current security and defence policies in Europe as well as their historical and cultural roots.